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Abstract
Motivated by a priori uncertainty with respect to the parametric specification of 
the earnings function, I model the earnings function as semiparametric partially 
linear model and follow the estimation approach described in Robinson (1988).
Using data from the personnel records of a large major UK based financial 
sector employer, I let years of within-firm and pre-firm experience form the 
nonparametrically modelled component of the earnings function. It is shown that 
the estimated within-firm experience earnings profiles, which are conditional 
upon a given number years of pre-firm experience accumulated before entry, 
converge and even overtake as years of pre-firm experience increases. This result
can be explained with the recognition of unobservable explanatory variables,
such as the match and individual quality of the employees, both of which are a 
function of years of within- and pre-firm experience and wages. 
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11. Introduction
The estimation of and interpretability of experience-earnings profiles are two 
topics which have generated significant attention in modern labour economics. 
With regard to the former, the conventional starting point for the specification 
of earnings functions1 stems from Mincer’s (1974) human capital earnings function in 
which the natural logarithm of earnings is expressed as the sum of a linear function of 
the number of years of school completed and as a quadratic function of years of total 
experience. Obviously more complex models of earnings determination necessitate 
the expansion of this benchmark earnings function with other covariates. Nonetheless 
the conventional Mincer equation - dictating the functional form relationship between 
earnings against schooling and experience - still remains the “workhorse” of empirical 
research on earnings determination and is probably the most widely used specification 
in empirical economics (Lemieux, 2006).  
The popularity of the quadratic term in experience can be attributed to the fact 
that it was derived by Mincer (1974) as closed form solution to a formal theoretical 
model of rational human capital accumulation in post-schooling training decisions 
(Ben-Porath, 1967). Though whether this specification is actually the truly most 
parsimonious benchmark model of earnings determination was systematically 
questioned in a seminal paper by Murphy and Welch (1990). Using CPS data from 
1964 to 1987, they illustrated that the low dimensionality of the quadratic 
specification could not capture important features of the profile. Finding this bias to 
be stable over time and across educational groups at a point in time, they proposed a 
quartic polynomial in total experience to be a specification with estimates of
sufficiently small enough bias to be considered for use as the standard parametric 
specification. The important point is that higher order polynomials in the specification 
of total experience can still yield estimates of declining earnings growth with time and 
this finding still retains consistency with the predictions of human capital theory. It 
was Mincer’s (1974) rather ad hoc assumption of a linearly declining investment ratio 
over the lifecycle that led to the quadratic in experience and such a specification 
naturally facilitates only a constant rate of decrease in earnings growth. The
specification issue has attracted only somewhat moderate attention since Murphy and 
Welch (1990), though Robinson (2003), Lemieux (2006) and Zheng (2000) have all 
presented evidence which have lent support to the conjecture that higher order 
polynomials are needed in total experience.2
One must note, however, that the entry of total years of experience as an 
independent variable in an earnings function is itself somewhat restrictive and is in 
fact a restriction which conventional human capital theory rejects. Total years of 
experience can be decomposed into a number of elements. To name two: years of 
experience before entering a firm and years of experience at a firm. The entry of total 
years of experience implicitly implies that the accumulation of each element has 
identical affect upon wages, so that their sum is a sufficient explanatory variable. 
Theory suggests otherwise and whilst empirical recognition of this insight is hardly 
new to labour economics, the appropriate specification of an earnings function which 
                                                
1 An earnings function refers to a regression of some measure of earnings on a given set of personal, 
market, or environmental variables thought to influence earnings (Willis, 1986).
2 Also see Basu and Ullah (1992) who respond to the specification uncertainty by estimating an 
earnings-age profile nonparametrically, but however make no comparison to any parametric estimates.
2explicitly differentiates between the two elements of total experience has attracted 
little, if any, significant attention. 
It is recognition for the need to differentiate between years of pre-firm and 
within-firm experience, as well as the a priori uncertainty regarding the entry of these 
variables in a parametric earnings function, which motivates the econometric 
approach in this paper. Using personnel data from a single large UK based financial 
sector employer and by modelling the earnings function as a semiparametric partially 
linear model where years of within-firm and years of pre-firm experience enter 
nonparametrically, and by estimating the earnings function across schooling groups, 
all a priori specification uncertainty is essentially lost.
With respect to the interpretability issue, modern human capital theory 
(Becker, 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967; Hashimoto, 1981; Mincer, 1974), of course, forms 
the conventional basis for explaining experience-earnings profiles. The theory argues 
that the cost of the accumulation of general human capital, through on-the-job 
training, is borne entirely by the worker as are the returns. The accumulation of such 
capital increases employees’ productivity and hence wage in all firms. The investment 
in specific human capital however – capital which is of value only in the firm in 
which it was acquired - is a joint investment between the worker and the firm, with 
the costs and returns to the investment being shared. A direct implication of specific 
human capital accumulation therefore is that there exists a seniority-earnings profile 
and that, once specific capital is accumulated, a given worker at a point in time will 
earn more at the firm in which the specific capital was acquired relative to the 
opportunity wage offered by other firms who offer wages based upon only the 
workers stock of general human capital.
The interpretation of wage growth with years in the labour market solely as a 
reflection of returns to these human capital investments may not necessarily follow 
however due to the existence of other plausible explanations of wage growth. Two 
well known alternatives are the delayed payment model of Lazear (1979, 1981) - a 
model which belongs to a much wider class of long-term incentive-compatible 
contracting models which seek to explain life- cycle wage growth independently to 
contemporaneous life-cycle productivity growth and instead view wage contracts as 
optimal responses to the asymmetries in information between employees and firms3-
and search models which are based on the existence of a match specific value which 
is attached to any given employee-firm relationship.
Lazear’s (1979, 1981) delayed payment or shirking model is an alternative 
explanation for the seniority-earnings profile.4 Essentially this model- as well as other 
models in the same class -stems from the fact that employers often have considerable 
difficulty in monitoring employees and in assessing their marginal product. Such 
                                                
3 These agency themed models with lifecycle implications fall roughly into three categories: Those 
which emphasise the seniority- earnings profile as stemming from either 1) The provision of life-cycle 
incentives by the firm; 2) selection and sorting mechanisms; or 3) Insurance motives. Becker and 
Stigler’s (1974) model was perhaps the first to fall into the first category, arguing that firms should 
separate the payment of workers from their output to keep workers from shirking. Salop and Salop 
(1976) proposed that firms implement steep seniority-earnings profiles with earnings less than 
productivity upon entry in order to discourage those with high propensity to quit from joining the firm 
(i.e. a self- selection model to alleviate asymmetric information problems) and consequently falls into 
the second category. Harris and Holmstrom’s (1982) model assumes that risk averse workers are 
uncertain about their future productivity and seek insurance against the possibility that they will turn 
out to be relatively unproductive, and falls into the latter category.
4 That is, it refers to the relation between earnings and tenure holding general experience effects 
constant (Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985, pp.728).
3cases being intuitively most relevant in circumstances in which the job entails team 
production, or where the job consists of numerous and varied tasks, or in particularly 
large firms in which there is an arms length relationship between employees and 
managers. Given such environments, employees have an inventive to put forward less 
effort, or shirk. Lazear’s model is one solution to this underlying agency problem.5 By 
supplying a contract which pays less than the value of marginal product at the start of 
tenure and more near the end, Lazear argues that the employer will illicit work effort 
from the employees as exerting low effort runs the risk of dismissal and the loss of the 
collateral which they put up early in their career. This therefore increases the expected 
present value of each employee’s net contribution to the firm and has a corresponding 
effect upon the expected present value of each employee’s lifetime wages. The model 
in fact predicts an upward sloping seniority- earnings profile even in the absence of 
any specific human capital accumulation.6 Empirical support for the hypothesis of an 
upward sloping earnings profile in the absence of increases in productivity was 
presented in Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) and Flabbi and Ichino (2001), though 
criticism of their approach centres on the inherently difficult task of measuring 
workers productivity.7 However, other studies have found support for the human 
capital explanation by directly investigating its core hypothesis: namely investments 
in training lead to increases in worker productivity and to increases in wages (see, 
Bartel, 1995; Brown, 1989; and Barron et al, 1989)
Job search models typically assume that wages can be expressed as a function 
of a time-invariant match quality parameter which is specific to a particular job-
employee match. As such, they emphasise that the source of wage growth is through 
mobility across jobs, and that this wage growth can occur independently to any 
productivity enhancing investments within jobs. These models generally fall into two 
categories: the ‘search good’ model of job matching which assumes that the quality of 
job matches is known upon inspection (Burdett, 1978) and the ‘experience good’ 
model of Jovanovic (1979) in which information as to the quality of the match is not 
known for certain ex ante, but updated as the job is ‘experienced.’ In the former 
model, the movement of a worker is therefore dependent on whether there exists a 
higher match quality in alternative employment and whether the gain from moving -
due to the higher wage offered in the better match - exceeds the loss from moving 
from the current employer – a loss which, in the human capital framework, stems 
from the share of the returns from specific human capital investment which was 
undertaken at this existing employer. In the latter model, turnover is generated by the
revelation of match quality and its relationship to the workers reservation match 
quality on the current job. Early in the match the reservation match quality will start 
low due to option value that the true match quality may turn out to be very high. A 
worker who receives a sequence of poor match quality signals, however, will 
continually revise down their belief about the true match quality, and as such the 
                                                
5 The most obvious other solution being that the firm devotes additional resources to the supervision of 
its employees.
6 An implicit assumption of the model is that the gain the firm would make from terminating a workers 
contract after they begin earning more than the value of their marginal product is less than the loss 
which would be incurred by such systematic unscrupulous behaviour by the firm. This conjecture can 
be supported if one assumes that a firm’s long-run productivity is a function of their reputation to 
society in general and to future and current employees. However this means that the model is best 
applied to large, visible firms.
7 For papers in which the central objective is to test the human capital explanation against the agency 
themed explanation, see Hellerstein and Neumark (1995), Lazear and Moore (1984), Hutchens (1987) 
and Brown and Sessions (2006).
4option value declines and the reservation match quality increases and they will choose 
to leave the firm. Ultimately therefore, the model predicts that the worst matches 
leave first, followed in succession with marginally better matches. Eventually only the 
higher quality matches remain.
It is recognition of this match heterogeneity as well as individual 
heterogeneity, both of which constitute the driving force for voluntary (or 
involuntary) movement across firms in the labour market, which has stemmed a rather 
substantial literature which attempts to estimate the returns to tenure.  Such 
heterogeneity implies that a standard earnings function will suffer from omitted
variable bias since both match quality and individual quality are unobservable to the 
econometrician but are correlated with years of tenure. There have been a number of 
methodological approaches derived to solve this problem. Altonji and Shakotko 
(1987) used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and instrumented years 
of tenure with the deviation of tenure from its mean for the sample observation on a 
given job match– an instrument they argue to be uncorrelated with the unobservable 
explanatory variables missing from the earnings function. They concluded that the 
true returns to tenure are minor (10 years of tenure leading to a 6.8 percent increase in 
earnings in their preferred specification) and that accumulation of general labour 
market experience (through either general human capital accumulation or labour 
market search) accounts for the lions share of wage growth over the career. This 
finding carries the implication that tenure at a firm has a much smaller role in shaping 
the structure of earnings as was previously thought and in turn categorically 
undermines the importance of an entire compensation literature in which wages are 
set as a devise for affecting worker productivity. Nevertheless Topel (1991) addressed 
the issue using essentially the same data, but a different methodological approach and
found that with his method there are estimated to be substantial tenure effects upon 
wages, with a tenure effect of 28 percent in the same period of time (also see, 
Bratsberg and Terrell, 1998; Williams, 1991; Abraham and Farber, 1987; Mincer and 
Jovanovic, 1981; and Altonji and Williams, 1997).
To shed light on how to interpret the estimated experience- earnings profiles 
consider a simple wage determination model of the form:8
ln ift 1 it 2 ift ift y β x + β s + ε=  (1)
Equation (1) states that the wage, y , of individual i in firm f in period t  is a 
function of years of pre-firm labour market experience, x , and years of service s  with 
the current employer and a disturbance ε .9 Disregarding heterogeneity in match 
quality or individual quality across employees, then 1β and 2β will represent the 
average returns to pre-firm experience and within-firm experience. Returns to pre-
firm experience reflect general human capital accumulated out-with the firm, while 
returns to within-firm experience reflect general human capital accumulated within 
the firm as well as the returns stemming from the seniority earnings profile - a profile 
which may be associated to employees return to specific human capital accumulated 
                                                
8 For notational simplicity, I abstract here from other explanatory variables and from higher order terms 
in pre firm or within firm experience or controls for secular wage growth with time. 
9 This model is analogous to the one which appears in Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991). 
However in their model, years of pre-firm experience is replaced with years of total experience. Their 
papers were concerned with estimating the returns to tenure and as such, in that scenario, the earnings 
function must be specified holding total experience constant, in order to capture tenures net effect.
5and/or a contractual solution to alleviate the principal-agent problem inherent in the 
worker-firm relationship.10 However let us decompose the disturbance term to 
introduce unobservable individual and match heterogeneity into the model. Let the 
decomposition take the form of an individual effect (i.e. innate ability) ia , which 
affects earnings equally across all firms, a firm-match effect ifm , representing the 
time-invariant productivity associated to a given employee-firm match,11 and a white 
noise error ijtu :
i if ift.ift ε = a  + m  + u (2)
Bias will be prevalent in the estimation of 1β   and 2β if covariance exists 
between the regressors in (1) and the unobservables in (2). The preceding discussion 
already suggested the existence of such covariance with respect to unobservable 
match quality ifm . Therefore let us firstly focus upon the bias generated by the 
existence of this unobservable by letting its relationship to the observed explanatory 
variables be written as
if 1 it 2 ift ift.x + s + em  = b  b (3)
Therefore 1 11 β β + bE

  and 2 2 2β β + bE

 . The ‘search’ model of Burdett 
(1978), at least, hypothesises that individuals’ match quality will rise with years of 
pre-firm experience as individuals have sampled a larger number of job-offers and 
have sequentially moved to better matches within the labour market before joining 
this particular firm. This implies that 1b > 0 and the estimation of ‘returns’ to pre-firm 
experience are upward biased. In fact, in the extreme scenario, the earnings of the 
given representative worker need not increase due to accumulated years of pre-firm 
experience -that is 1β =0, yet in the cross-section of workers observed, those entering 
the firm with greater years of pre-firm experience are expected to be of a better match 
quality and naturally are rewarded with a higher wage upon entry –so 1b >0 - and the 
positive estimated return to pre-firm experience is completely spurious. The direction 
of the bias due to unobservable match quality upon the estimation of returns to within-
firm experience, on the other hand, is ambiguous. An employee with long tenure at 
the firm has chosen not to move firm, so may conceivably be expected to be in a 
better match compared to an employee with short tenure (Jovanovic, 1979). 
Aggregating the same scenario across all employees means that we would expect 2b > 
0 and returns to within-firm experience are biased upward. On the other hand, an 
employee with a short observed length of tenure may have left not because they were 
a bad match, but because they have found a better match elsewhere (Burdett, 1978). 
Aggregation of this scenario suggests that we would expect 2b < 0 and returns to 
within-firm experience to be biased downward.12
                                                
10 For instance, the solution of incentive problems could foster the accumulation of specific human 
capital. As such there may be a degree of non-mutual exclusivity between the implications of the 
competing - agency versus human capital - explanations for the seniority-earnings profile (Brunello and 
Ariga, 1997)) 
11 Note that the ifm  term may also reflect the variation in wages across firms as discussed in the 
efficiency wage literature (Parsons, 1986).
12 Topel (1991) notes that significant mobility costs reinforce the 2b < 0 hypothesis, while costly 
search suggests that 2b > 0 as only those with relatively poor matches will actively search. Stevens 
(2003) also argues that 2b < 0, as workers with high levels of specific human capital – and hence years 
of tenure- will stay with the firm even when the match quality is actually low. Therefore in a sample of 
6In addition to the unobservable matching bias, there is also bias expected to be 
generated due to the covariance between the unobservable individual effect ia  in 
equation (2) and years of within-firm experience. Let the relationship be written as:
i ift ifta  = ct  + .? (4)
We would expect individuals of higher ability13 naturally to earn more and 
would also expect that individuals of higher ability are less likely to be dismissed by 
the firm. Therefore it is expected that c >0. This implies that we will observe
individuals with high years of within firm experience being better paid relative to
those with low years of within firm experience, though this differential will not be 
exclusively due to these high tenured individuals being more productive through 
human capital investment, or through reaping the benefits of some delayed payment 
incentive in operation in the firm. 
This conceptual earnings determination model has highlighted the fact that the 
estimated experience-earnings profiles themselves cannot be given a strict a priori 
interpretation. They will reveal how wages vary with years of pre-firm and within-
firm experience, though this estimated variation cannot be attributed exclusively as
‘returns’ to pre-firm or within firm experience. Nevertheless, the merit of the 
estimates is that they will naturally serve as a useful descriptive summary of the 
structure of compensation and its relationship with years of previous and within-firm 
experience of the individuals who are employed in the firm. The nature of the 
estimated wage evolution can then be reconciled with the theory which was imbedded 
in the model presented above.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
semiparametric model and describes the nonparametric estimation technique. Section 
3 discusses the data used and provides some preliminary statistical analysis of the 
dataset. Under the assumption that the grade in the hierarchy occupied by an 
employee is indicative to some extent of their individual ability ( ia ) and match quality 
( ifm ) some incite can be gauged in support of the hypothesis presented above and this 
is shown to be helpful in interpreting the within-firm experience earnings profiles, the 
estimates of which are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with 
a summary of what has been achieved and a discussion.
2. Nonparametric Modelling and Estimation of the Earnings Function
2.1. Semiparametric Model
Let the earnings function be given by
                                                                                                                                           
accepted wages, specific human is negatively correlated with match quality. Lazear’s (1986) raiding 
model also has input into the direction of bias debate. He argues that employee’s wages are used by the 
firms’ competitors as signals of their quality and predicts that the best workers are ‘stolen away’ so that 
the remaining workers tend to be relatively less able than their departing peers. This model implies 
therefore that the average returns to within-firm experience are biased downward and that the bias is 
upward for returns to pre-firm experience.
13
The unobservable individual effect could also be viewed as an index of an employee’s stability as 
opposed to an index of innate ability. More stable employees naturally tend to have longer years of 
tenure will be - for instance due to turnover and training costs - of greater value to a firm.
7i i i i        ln y = f(x ,a ) + ε (i = 1,......n), (5)
where iy  represents the wage of individual i , ix is a (1 x 2) vector with elements 
representing years of experience prior to joining the firm and years of tenure with the 
employer. ia is (1 x k) vector of discrete variables further charactering the given 
individual. I assume that i i iE(ε  / x , a
? ?
 = 0. 
Firstly I note that I choose to estimate the earnings function: a) across two 
schooling groups; and b) for male and female employees separately. Therefore, more 
specifically, the earnings function (5) relates to an individual i  in schooling groups , 
with gender g . The choice to remove schooling as an explanatory variable and to 
estimate the earnings function across two schooling groups – where the group an 
individual is placed in is conditional upon their highest educational qualification 
attained before entry into the labour market – is largely driven by a priori uncertainty 
as to the appropriate entry of schooling in the earnings function. The conventional 
linear entry of years of schooling - which dictates the assumption that each year of 
education, no matter at what level, has the same proportional effect on earnings - has 
been widely challenged in more recent literature.14 In addition to this, the additively 
separable entry of schooling – which stems from Mincer’s (1974) assumption that the
proportion of earnings devoted to the production of human capital is the same 
regardless of years of schooling attained – has also been challenged. For instance, 
individuals with low learning ability may naturally have less schooling and flatter 
earnings profiles (see, Lemieux, 2006; Heckman et al, 2003; Schady, 2003; and 
Hungerford and Solon, 1987 for evidence and discussion of these issues). Eliminating 
the entry of schooling as an explanatory variable is appealing the context and 
objective of this paper for it naturally leaves open the possibility of marginal 
differences across schooling groups in the experience profiles.
The choice to separate males and females and to estimate the earnings 
functions separately for both sexes is conventional. Firstly, years of pre-firm 
experience is not explicitly identified in the data set and is therefore proxied with a 
‘potential’ pre-firm experience index, given the available data of age, years of service, 
and (proxied) years of schooling of each individual employee. As such, there is 
expected to be larger measurement error in the pre-firm experience variable for 
women compared to men (see, Bratsberg and Terrell, 1998; Light and Ureta, 1995; 
and Light, 1998 for demonstration of the sensitivity of estimates with regard to the 
assumptions made with respect to the construction of proxied measures of 
experience). Secondly, there exists strong logical theoretic justification for the sex 
separation. Under the human capital explanation for wage growth, the incentive to 
invest in ones-self – or equivalently the firm’s incentive to invest in an individual- is a 
function of expectations with regard to the continuity of labour force attachment. As 
such, there is less incentive for women -in the aggregate- to invest, given that they are 
more likely to suffer an interruption to their career. There is also the well documented 
                                                
14 There are two potential theoretical sources of misspecification with regard to the linear entry of years 
of schooling.  Firstly, the mean earnings premium may be higher for some levels of education 
compared to others. For example the earnings premium from university education may be higher than 
secondary if there are differences in the cost or quality of education or if there are changes in market 
supply and demand across these two levels. Secondly, the earnings premium from the last year of 
schooling within a particular level may be higher than in any other intervening year. See (Schady, 
2003, pp.191) for discussion of three possible reasons for the existence of such credentialism or 
sheepskin effects.
8rebound effect of human capital accumulation and wage growth which occurs upon 
re-entry into the labour market as skills depreciated during the career interruption are 
restored (see, Mincer and Polachek, 1974 and Mincer and Ofek, 1980).
The question which remains is how to specify f(.)? As already discussed, there 
has been a body of existing work expressing dissatisfaction with the quadratic entry of 
years of total labour market experience in the conventional parametric specification of 
the earnings function. Clearly then, the a priori uncertainty regarding the adequacy of 
the quadratic specification of total experience in the earnings function leads directly 
to an uncertainty regarding appropriate specification of pre-firm and within-firm
experience - the two elements of total experience which I explicitly differentiate 
between. It is this uncertainty which motivates the nonparametric approach taken in 
this paper. In the nonparametric setting, the object of estimation is not a finite number 
of parameters in a model, but the regression function f(.) itself. While parametric 
specification of the experience variables in the earnings function will constrain the 
estimates of the earnings profiles to follow a specified and strict structure governed by 
a finite number of parameters, nonparametric estimation methods- apart from 
assuming the average value of the response is a smooth and continuous function of the 
predictors - impart no assumptions as to the functional form. As such, the uncertainly 
over the exact (parametric) specification to adopt is lost. 
However the added flexibility of nonparametric regression comes at a cost. As 
there are five predictors in the earnings function, a fully nonparametric specification 
is infeasible for the rate of convergence of the nonparametric estimator slows down 
dramatically as the dimension of the model (number of predictors) increases: the so 
called ‘curse of dimensionality.’ Fully nonparametrically modelling of the earnings 
function would lead to a requirement of an impractically large sample in order to 
obtain estimates of acceptable levels of precision.15 In response to this, some 
modelling restrictions need to be imposed at the outset. Given that the motivation of 
this study is with respect to the estimation of the experience-earnings profiles, I 
choose to let years of pre-firm experience and years of within-firm experience enter 
the model nonparametrically, while I let the remaining (discrete) explanatory 
variables enter in a parametric fashion. Specifically, I augment (5) and model the 
earnings function as a partially-linear semiparametric model given by,16
i i i iln y = f(x) + aβ + ε         (i=1,.....n), (6)
where ia is (1 x k) vector of discrete explanatory variables and β is a (k x 1) vector of 
parameters to be estimated. ix is a (1 x 2) vector including the two forms of labour 
force experience of each individual i : experience prior to entry and tenure. The 
function f(.)  remains unspecified. The disturbance term satisfies i i iE(ε  / x , a ) = 0.
                                                
15 As well as this theoretical reason, there are also practical reasons which essentially preclude fully 
nonparametric modelling in this case. As the number of predictors in a nonparametric model expands,
the interpretability and presentation of the estimation results becomes increasingly cumbersome. Fully 
nonparametric modelling of the earnings function would mean that I could only present an estimated 
within firm experience-earnings profile which was conditional on given values of all the other 
predictors held constant. Both reasons therefore render the use of a fully unrestricted nonparametric 
regression undesirable. 
16 Other papers in the economics literature to have specified a partially-linear semiparametric model 
then to have followed the estimation method of Robinson (1988) include Anglin and Gencay (1996) 
and Schmalensee and Stoker (1999). 
9Robinson (1988) shows that this model can be rewritten as17
i i i i i i iln y - E(ln y | x ) = (a  - E(a  | x ))β + ε .       (7)
Therefore this suggests a two-step method in the estimation of the model 
parameters β . First, the conditional means i iE(ln y | x ) and i iE(a  | x ) are estimated by 
some method of nonparametric estimation. Then, second, these estimates are 
substituted in place of the unknown functions in (7), and then β is estimated by 
ordinary least squares. The resulting parameter estimates are n1/2 consistent and 
asymptotically normal.
Then, since i i i if(x) = E(ln y - aβ | x ), and given the parameter estimates β

we 
can estimate the regression function if(x) by a nonparametric regression of 
i i iln y - a β on x .

Or, equivalently, the same estimate of if(x) is given by 
i i i iE (ln y | x ) - E (a  | x )β.
  
This methodology is therefore somewhat of an intermediate strategy between 
the fully nonparametric and parametric approach; combining the high flexibility and 
robustness of the nonparametric approach and the faster convergence rate obtained in 
the parametric one. The model is more restrictive than the fully nonparametric as it 
rules out interaction between the measures of experience and any of the discrete 
variables in the determination of wages, but remains less restrictive than a parametric 
specification which brings some form of straightjacket to the entry of within firm 
experience and pre-firm experience (and their interaction) in the modelling of their 
effects on wages. However this modelling strategy has the advantage of alleviating
the curse of dimensionality associated with fully nonparametric estimation and lends 
for easier analysis of the experience profiles- since the experience profiles are 
estimated with the impact of the other predictors held constant.
2.2. Nonparametric estimation and smoothing parameter selection
As well as the class of nonparametric model to estimate, there are two other 
important choices to be made with respect to nonparametric estimation: a) the 
nonparametric method (or smoother) to undertake the estimation; and b) the type of 
smoothing parameter (or bandwidth) and the method of choosing this smoothing 
parameter. With regard to the first I choose to apply local linear regression and with 
regard to the second, I choose to use nearest neighbour bandwidths, with the 
bandwidths for all the nonparametric regressions chosen by generalized cross 
validation (Craven and Wahba, 1979). 
Local linear regression with variable bandwidth - as a nonparametric 
regression technique - was developed for the case of a single independent variable in 
Cleveland (1979) and then extended to the multivariate case in Cleveland and Devlin 
(1988).18 Utilisation of this method is a departure from standard approach in the 
applied economics literature, where the dominant estimator utilised remains the kernel 
or local constant estimator with fixed bandwidth (developed by Nadaraya (1964) and 
                                                
17 Given that i i i i i iE(ln y | x ,a) = f(x) + E(a | x)β
18 The authors also present several interesting case studies in which local regression is seen to be more 
insightful than classical linear regression.
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Watson (1964)).19 The motivation for this departure comes from Fan and Gijbels 
(1992) and Ruppert and Wand (1994)20 who illustrate asymptotic properties of the 
local linear estimator with variable bandwidth and demonstrate its superiority over the 
kernel estimator. Specifically, they illustrate that the bias and variance near the 
boundary of the local linear estimator are of the same order of magnitude as the 
interior, whilst local mean estimation suffers boundary bias near the edges of the 
region over which the data have been collected.
To intuitively describe the nonparametric methodology utilised here, consider 
the fully nonparametric model:21
i iiy  = f(x) + ε , (8)
where iy  is a quantitative dependent variable and i 1 2x  = (x ,x ) is a vector of two 
quantitative explanatory variables. i iE(ε  / x ) = 0 .  Given the data i i{y,x}, i =1,..n , the 
aim of nonparametric estimation is to estimate i i if(x) = E(y | x ) - the conditional mean 
of iy  given ix - without the specification of any parametric form for if(x).
Consider the plot of observations iy against the observations ix . Though there 
is likely to be a lot of noise in such a plot, the shape of the plot may still roughly 
reveal how the mean of iy  changes with ix . Nonparametric estimation proceeds by 
evaluating the data at a series of focal points 0 01 02x  = (x , x ) - which are typically taken 
to be the observations ix  themselves. The estimation of the regression function then 
takes place at each focal point 0x . Central to the methodology is the intuitively 
sensible assertion that the observations at or around a given focal point are more 
informative to the conditional mean relationship at that particular point than those 
observations which are distant. Given this, estimation proceeds by defining a 
‘neighbourhood’ around each focal point and then ‘averaging’ the response values of 
the observations which fall in each neighbourhood.  This clearly then leads to two 
logical questions: 1) how do we ‘average’ response values in a given neighbourhood? 
2) How do we define the given ‘neighbourhood’ and how large do we make it?22
For each focal point 0x , let us, for now, arbitrarily define a bandwidth 
0h(x ) and a corresponding smoothing window, which captures the neighbourhood 
around each focal point 0 0 0 0((x -h(x ),(x +h(x )). Let i 0i
0
x  - xz  = h(x ) give the scaled 
distance between the predictor value for the ith observation and the focal value. We
then need a kernel (weight) function that assigns greater weight to those observations 
that are closer to 0x . I choose the tricube weight function proposed by Cleveland 
(1979), which is given by i i i3 3w(z) = (1- |z | )  if |z | < 1, or 0 if otherwise. Therefore 
observations ix  falling outside the smoothing window are given zero weight, while 
the weight given to observations falling inside the window falls off symmetrically and 
                                                
19 Among various other nonparametric methods (or smoothers) there includes spline smoothers and 
orthogonal series. Simonoff (1996), Hastie and Tibshirani (1990), Hardle (1990) and Hardle et al 
(2004) all outline these and various other methods.
20 Fan and Gijbels (1992) look at uni-variate local regression while Ruppert and Wand (1994) extend to 
multivariate.
21 Some excellent review papers of nonparametric regression methods include Cleveland and Loader 
(1996), DiNardo and Tobias (2001), Yatchew (1998) and Blundell and Duncan (1998).
22 This intuitive description implicitly assumed that the two explanatory variables were measured in the 
same metric. The question of how to define a neighbourhood around x0 when predictors are in different 
scales is explored in Fox (2000, pp.15-17).
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smoothly as i 0|x  - x | grows.23 Given the choice of weight function, we now perform a 
weighted linear least squares regression at the given focal point 0x  to minimise the 
weighted sum of square residuals:
i 0 0 i 01 1 1 02 i
0 0 1
n
2
a ,b ,b
i=1
min (y-(a +b (x-x )-b (x -x )) w(z). (9)
The local linear estimate at 0x is 0 0f (x )= a
 
as this defines the position of the 
local regression line at the point 0x . The method proceeds in the same manor for each 
focal point 0x and the fitted values are connected. Higher order polynomials can of 
course be utilised and can be shown to decrease the bias of the estimate, while 
increasing the variance. There is theoretical advantage to odd ordered polynomials. 
Namely, the polynomial of odd order p +1 has the same asymptotic variance as the 
polynomial of even order p, but lower bias (see, Fan and Gijbels, 1996 and Simonoff, 
1996). Nevertheless it is generally agreed that the linear approach is sufficiently 
flexible for most purposes.24
A constant bandwidth which looks a fixed distance to the left and right of each 
focal point is clearly the simplest specification. However this can potentially lead to 
empty neighbourhoods when the independent variables have non-uniform 
distributions. However data sparisity problems can be reduced by ensuring the 
neighbourhoods contain sufficient data. Nearest neighbour bandwidths choose 0h(x )
so that the local neighbourhood always contains a specified number of points.
Therefore the distance of the bandwidth conforms to the density of the data around 
that particular focal point. Specifically, nearest neighbour bandwidths involve 
choosing a fixed number k of the nearest observations around each focal value. 
Therefore the neighbourhoods are set according to the equality k=nα, where n is the 
total number of observations and α ε (0,1) is the fixed ratio of nearest observations 
relative to total observations to be used as the neighbourhood for estimation at each 
focal point, also called the span. The degree of smoothing applied to the data can 
therefore be expressed by the span of the estimator.
The question that remains is how large to make the span of the local linear 
estimator? The expressions for the mean and variance of the multivariate local linear 
estimate at a focal point is given in Ruppert and Wand (1994), where it is shown as 
the smoothing parameter increases the bias increases, but conversely the variance 
decreases. As such the chosen smoothing parameter is of central importance for it 
                                                
23 There are many other weighting functions with the same properties (see, DiNardo and Tobias (2001), 
table 1). Though it has been generally established that the particular choice of weighting function does 
not seem to matter a great deal (Ullah ,1988, pp.643)
24
Local constant least squares regression attempts to minimise the weighted sum of square residuals of 
the following criterion:
i i 0
n
2
i=1
w(z)(y - a ) .
The minimizer of which is obviously
i i
0 0
i
n
i=1
n
i=1
w(z)y
f (x )= a =
w(z)
  

.This is the popular kernel estimator 
proposed by Nadaraya (1964) and Watson (1964).
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dictates a statistical compromise between bias and variance. To assess the overall 
performance of the fit however we need to create a measure of performance which 
represents the global behaviour of the estimator. One such measure is the prediction 
mean-squared error for future observations:
h i h i
n
* 2
i=1
1
PMSE = E[y -f (x )] ,
n
 (10)
where iy * is a new observation at ix  and h if (x)

is its local linear estimate conditional 
upon the nearest neighbour bandwidth h. This motivates a cross-validated estimate of 
the prediction mean-squared error, given by
h i -i,h i
n
* 2
i=1
1
CV = [y -f (x)] ,
n
 (11)
where -i,h if (x)

denotes the local linear estimate at ix -conditional upon nearest 
neighbour bandwidth h- computed by leaving out the ith data point.25 The optimal 
smoothing parameter can then be found iteratively, with the chosen parameter being 
the one which minimises the cross validation score. Justification for this selection 
procedure is that E[CVh] ≈ PMSEh (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990).
As local regression solves a least squares problem, the fitted values if

can be 
expressed as a weighed sum of the observed iy values and there exists an (n x n) 
smoother matrix S, which maps the data to the fitted values:
ihf

= yS (12)
where ih h 1 h 2f = ( f (x ).....f (x ))'
  
is the column vector of fitted values and 1 ny = (y ,....y )'
the column vector of observed response values. Each row of S consists of the weights 
appropriate to estimation at each ix  and the diagonal elements of the smoother matrix 
measure the sensitivity of the fitted curve ihf

 to the individual data points ix - the 
leverage values of each observation.
It can be shown that CVh can be written as a function of these fitted values,
i i
h
iih
n
2
i=1
1 y-f(x)
CV = [ ]
n 1-s

 (13)
where siih is the i
th diagonal element of the smoother matrix.
                                                
25 This is also known as the jackknifed fit at xi. Note that if the ith observation was not omitted then the 
smoothing parameter which minimises the cross validation measure will be zero and the estimator will 
simply interpolate the observed data h i  if (x)=y

: the fitted and observed values will be equal (if x-
values are distinct).
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Degrees of freedom for the nonparametric regression model can therefore be 
defined in a way with analogy to linear least squares regression.26 That is, the 
approximate number of degrees-of-freedom is the number of parameters is the trace 
of the smoother matrix:
DF= tr(S). (14)
This motivates the generalized cross validation criterion for smoothing 
parameter selection. This criterion provides an approximation to cross validation and 
is easier to compute for it replaces each value1 - siih with their average 
2tr(S)1-( ) .
n
Therefore the two criteria are similar except the generalised cross 
validation approach effectively down-weights, or penalizes the effects of high 
leverage points (Simonoff, 1996). Hence the generalised cross validation score for the 
nonparametric estimate is given by:
i h i
h
2n
2i=1
1 [y-f (x )]
GCV = .
tr( )n [1-( )]
n

 S (15)
Minimisation of the criterion therefore involves a trade-off between the 
goodness of fit of the model and model parsimony. Model parsimony being expressed 
as a function of the equivalent degrees of freedom tr(S). (See, Hastie and Tibshirani, 
1990 and Loader, 1999a for a discussion and motivation for the use of this method)
These automatic or classical methods for choosing the smoothing parameter 
have come under attack in recent literature as their performance in practice is 
sometimes questionable. An alternative approach which has been proposed is to 
construct a ‘plug-in’ estimator of the optimal smoothing parameter from solving to 
minimise the average mean square error of the estimator i i
n
2
i=1
1
E[ f (x )-f(x)]
n
 and 
replacing the unknown parameters in such an expression with estimates. Fan and 
Gijbels (1995, 1996) illustrate this approach for local linear regression. However, the
classical versus plug-in smoothing parameter selection debate is still somewhat in its 
infancy and Loader (1999b) surveys the issue and existing evidence at some length 
and argues that the variability of the classical approaches is not a problem, but simply 
an underlying symptom of the difficulty of smoothing parameter choice.
In the first stage of the Robinson (1988) estimation approach outlined in the 
previous section the method of local linear logistic regression - a method which 
belongs to a much wider class of generalized nonparametric regression models - is 
used to nonparametrically estimate the conditional means i iE(a  | x ) when the 
dependent variable is binary. The nonparametric augmentation to generalised linear 
models is conceptually identical as that to parametric ordinary linear models. Namely, 
the nonparametric models retain the random component and link function of the 
generalized linear model, but the predictors are entered as a smooth function of the 
response. Fan et al (1995) analyse nonparametric estimates in the context of local 
                                                
26 That is, in a standard linear model of the form yi = Xiβ +εi, the matrix S is analogous to the projection 
matrix or hat matrix H = X(X′X)-1X′ where X=(X′1….X′k) and the degrees of freedom of the model is 
equal to the number of parameters, given by tr(H).
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generalised linear models and derive expressions for bias and variance in that setting. 
They show that the attractive properties of the local polynomial approach as opposed 
to the traditional kernel approach also carry over in generalized nonparametric 
models. 
3. Data Analysis
A cross-section of data is drawn from the personnel records of a large major 
UK based financial sector employer. The data covers all UK based employees and 
gives a snapshot of their status on the 1st December 1999. I choose to focus upon full-
time employees only, with full-time being defined as a working week of 30 or more 
hours.27 As the birth dates of all employees are available, the age of employees at this 
point in time is calculated straightforwardly. Likewise, as an exact entry date into the 
firm is available, length of within-firm experience (or service) is also measured 
exactly. Years of formal schooling are not explicitly listed in the data set but, instead 
information regarding the highest qualification upon entry into the firm is available. 
Those employees for which this information is not available are excluded. This 
information is then used to construct a proxy for years of experience in the labour 
market attained out-with the firm. I let the achievement of a degree translate to 16 
years of formal schooling; further education to 14 years; A-level (or equivalent) to 13 
years and GCSE (or equivalent) to 11 years. I then use this mapping to proxy years of 
pre-firm experience by age - years of service-years of schooling-5. Therefore 
measurement error in the proxied years of pre-firm experience variable will stem from 
both the assumptions made by the mapping of years of schooling and from time spent 
out-with the firm in which the employees were not in full time employment. Instead 
of entering a set of schooling dummies as explanatory variables in the earnings 
function, I choose to estimate the earnings function across two schooling groups. I 
calculate a (gross) hourly wage for each individual using information on weekly 
contracted hours and by summing annual salary, annual allowance, ‘London’ 
allowance, and an annual company profit related bonus which was received on the 1st
of May 1999. Over 60 percent of the staff observed received a bonus. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of this calculated hourly wage. In addition to these 
key variables of interest I generate three dummy variables further characterising each 
individual. They relate to region of employment, marital status, and whether the 
employee has children.28
The earnings function is therefore estimated across four cells encompassing 
the two genders and two schooling groups which are: 1) Higher education: the set of 
employees who have achieved a degree or who have attained some form of further 
education prior to entry into the labour market; and 2) secondary education: the 
employees who have achieved up to secondary-school level qualifications prior to 
entry. I choose to specify only two schooling groups – even though the data permits 
up to four- in order to increase the number of observations falling in each 
gender/schooling-level cell. In total there are 21,702 observations. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the data.
                                                
27 The motivation for doing so is to eliminate labour supply effects upon the determination of earnings, 
so that hours worked need not appear as an explanatory variable in the earnings function. 
28 I note that these variables may be considered as endogenous and consequently the estimated effects 
of these variables upon wages may be biased. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Data
Mean St.dev  Min Max Mean St.dev  Min Max
Males/ Secondary Educationa                                          Males/Higher Educationb
lnhrwage 2.47 .53 1.40 5.41 2.93 .62 1.41 5.29
pexpernet 7.27 7.84 0 57.27 5.85 6.32 0 48.66
service 8.37 7.28 0 41.91 9.07 8.60 0 39.25
ms .44 .50 0 1 . .52 .50 0 1
child .32 .49 0 1 .40 .49 0 1
region .38 .49 0 1 .48 .50 0 1
Females/ Secondary Educationc                                       Females/Higher Educationd
lnhrwage 2.17 .31 1.40 4.03 2.49 .52 1.41 4.56
pexpernet 7.32 7.70 0 45.60 4.68 5.43 0 33.93
service 7.39 6.23 0 37.30 6.74 6.84 0 36.28
ms .42 .49 0 1 .39 .49 0 1
child .24 .42 0 1 .18 .39 0 1
region .23 .42 0 1 . .36 .48 0 1
note: the number of observations in each cell is: a) 5,584; b) 5,115; c) 8,318; d) 2,685
The variables in table 1 are defined as follows:
lnhrwage is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage 
pexpernet is the proxied number of years of pre-firm labour market experience
service is years of within-firm labour market experience (or tenure)
ms= 1 if the employee is married
child=1 if the employee has at least one child
region=1 if the employee works within greater London
The summary statistics presented in table 1 somewhat cloud the distributions 
of the key variables. Therefore I present in figure 1 the nonparametrically estimated 
univariate density functions for lnhwage, pexpernet and service using the all the data. 
In the interest of parsimony, the plots for each of the four cells are not presented. 
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Figure 1. Kernel Density Estimates of lnhrwage, pexpernet and service
Figure 1 shows that the log earnings density function is positively skewed.
Those at the top of the earnings distribution are earning considerably more than the 
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rest. The employees in the firm are predominantly hired when relatively new to the 
labour market. In fact over 20 percent of the observed workers have less than 1 year
of labour market experience out-with the firm, over 56 percent having less than 10, 
and nearly 93 percent of the employees have less than 20. Just fewer than 16 percent 
of staff have less than one year of service, over 61 percent having less than ten and 
over 91 percent of the employees have less than 20 years of service.
The firm has an explicit hierarchical structure in which workers can be 
assigned to one of 14 grades.29 Two of the grades seem not to be a part of the 
hierarchy, but are unclassified states. Excluding these grades, the rest of the 
hierarchical structure is simple and can be divided into three or four significant levels, 
consisting of training grades T1-T3, clerical grades C1 – C2, middle management 
grades M1-M2 and senior management grades SM1-SM5. In table 2, I present the 
relationship between the grades in the hierarchy, the number of workers in each grade, 
the average years of both pre-firm and within-firm experience of the workers 
observed in each grade as well as the average hourly wage within each grade. I do this 
for each of the four gender/schooling group classes of employed workers. In the 
aggregate, 19 percent of all the employees are in training grades, 36 percent in 
clerical, 24 percent in middle management, 11 percent in senior management, the 
residual being unclassified. Such aggregation however clouds the observed 
heterogeneity across the gender/schooling classes. Of male employees with a higher 
level of education, 67 percent are in either middle or senior management grades. For 
males with a secondary level of education, the ratio is 37 percent, and the ratio for 
females with higher education and those with a secondary education is 42 percent and 
12 percent respectively. Moreover, with regard to senior management grades, over 85 
percent of employees in this category are male, with 65 percent of these males having 
a higher level of education. The conclusion to be drawn from these summary statistics 
is that, regardless of gender, it appears that the accumulation of a higher level of 
education results in a much higher probability of being employed in a managerial 
grade and that male employees tend to fair much better than their female colleagues in 
terms of placement into higher parts of the hierarchy.30 Such heterogeneity with 
regard to placement in the hierarchy across schooling groups and gender adds further 
justification in the decision to separate the data across the four cells in the estimation 
of the earnings function. 
                                                
29 Treble et al (2001) analyse this firm’s personnel data from January 1989 to March 1997 and present a 
detailed descriptive analysis of the structure of this firm’s hierarchy, promotion policies, the ports of 
entry and exit, pay policies and their relationship with the hierarchical levels.
30 Lazear and Rosen (1990) argue that firms will set a higher promotion standard for women relative to 
men, as job leaving among those who are promoted imposes a cost on the firm and that women’s 
greater non-market abilities and opportunities lead to a higher likelihood of departure. 
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Table 2
Structure of Firm Hierarchy and Relationship between Years of Experience and Grade in Hierarchy 
   a. Males/Secondary Education                                                                                                         b. Males/Higher Education
Grade Number 
of 
Workers
Percent Mean of 
Pexpernet
Mean  of 
Service
Mean of 
Hourly Wage
Grade Number 
of 
Workers
Percent Mean of 
Pexpernet
Mean  of
Service
Mean of 
Hourly Wage
T1 8 0.14 2.51 (.48) .75 (.45) 5.19 (.70) T1 1 0.02 27.72 (.00) 2.84 (.00) 5.77 (.00)
T2 180 3.22 6.02 (.56) 1.52 (.27) 6.35 (.18) T2 21 0.41 3.90 (1.21) 2.09 (.58) 7.80 (.86)
T3 885 15.85 6.75 (.23) 2.61 (.12) 6.95 (.04) T3 247 4.83 4.14 (.36) 1.96 (.21) 6.68 (.07)
C1 1,129 20.22 6.61 (.21) 6.66 (.16) 9.31 (.08) C1 368 7.19 4.47 (.27) 4.57 (.26) 9.47 (.21)
C2 824 14.76 5.87 (.25) 9.40 (.22) 11.01 (.08) C2 437 8.54 3.74 (.23) 5.55 (.34) 10.64 (.08)
M1 959 17.17 6.42 (.24) 10.46 (.20) 14.50 (.11) M1 905 17.69 5.19 (.21) 7.80(.25) 14.81 (.11)
M2 609 10.91 8.23 (.36) 12.52 (.30) 19.63 (.12) M2 991 19.37 5.58 (.20) 11.13 (.28) 20.79 (.16)
SM1 331 5.93 10.29 (.52) 14.11 (.49) 29.37 (.45) SM1 797 15.58 5.60 (.22) 13.50 (.32) 29.48 (.27)
SM2 119 2.13 12.22 (.81) 11.94 (.88) 48.07 (1.09) SM2 491 9.60 8.67 (.34) 12.01 (.39) 46.21 (.58)
SM3 33 0.59 13.17 (2.14) 15.29 (1.71) 66.13 (2.48) SM3 209 4.09 9.93 (.48) 12.74 (.61) 62.83 (1.08)
SM4 3 0.05 7.59 (5.21) 23.32 (4.47) 97.63 (14.56) SM4 31 0.61 10.88 (1.48) 14.11 (1.63) 93.92 (4.94)
SM5 - - - - - SM5 1 0.02 6.86 (.00) 20.34 (.00) 120.88 (.00)
5,080 90.97 4,499 87.96
c. Females/Secondary Education                                                                                                      d. Females/Higher Education
Grade Number 
of 
Workers
Percent Mean of 
Pexpernet
Mean of 
Service
Mean of 
Hourly Wage
Grade Number 
of 
Workers
Percent Mean of 
Pexpernet
Mean of 
Service
Mean of 
Hourly Wage
T1 8 0.10 4.46 (3.43) 1.56 (1.18) 5.26 (.56 ) T1 - - - -
T2 171 2.06 4.96 (.56) .98 (.18) 5.54 (.10) T2 13 0.48 7.20 (2.54) 1.17 (.46) 6.19 (.18)
T3 2,207 26.53 7.57 (.16) 3.18 (.09) 6.86 (.02) T3 364 13.56 3.80 (.22) 1.88 (.13) 6.69 (.08)
C1 2,755 33.12 7.17 (.15) 8.41 (.11) 8.56 (.03) C1 448 16.69 4.09 (.23) 5.38 (.25) 8.43 (.09)
C2 1,446 17.38 6.54 (.19) 10.47 (.15) 10.54 (.04) C2 370 13.78 4.03 (.28) 7.77 (.38) 10.60 (.11)
M1 758 9.11 6.05 (.26) 11.12 (.19) 13.24 (.08) M1 502 18.70 3.912 (.23) 8.82 (.33) 13.41 (.11)
M2 209 2.51 7.95 (.56) 11.78 (.48) 18.11 (.26) M2 357 13.30 5.04 (.30) 9.78 (.39) 19.50 (.25)
SM1 58 0.70 8.48 (1.05) 13.97 (.98) 25.94 (.76) SM1 171 6.37 6.03 (.43) 9.44 (.57) 29.57 (.64)
SM2 9 0.11 9.72 (2.44) 12.58 (2.45) 43.46 (1.94) SM2 83 3.09 7.89 (.81) 10.11 (.86) 43.87 (1.36)
SM3 2 0.02 8.74 (2.80) 22.47 (2.91) 41.45 (4.19) SM3 15 0.56 12.03 (1.53) 9.53 (1.31) 56.13 (4.09)
SM4 - - - - - SM4 3 0.11 10.97 (2.03) 10.91 (1.73) 77.85 (3.38)
SM5 - - - - - SM5 - - - - -
7,623 91.64 2,326 86.63
Note: Grade in the hierarchy begins with lowest and ends with the highest. T1-T3 are training grades, C1 – C2 are clerical 
grades, M1-M2 are middle management grades and SM1-SM5 are senior management grades. Workers who are in unclassified 
grades in the hierarchy are not represented in the table. Pexpernet refers to the proxied number of years of pre-firm labour market 
experience, while Service refers to years of within-firm labour market experience (or tenure)
The nature of the data utilised here presents a valuable opportunity to assess 
the relationship between expected match-quality and individual quality with years of 
pre-firm and within-firm experience, as modelled in equations 3 and 4. It would be 
expected that the nature of the jobs required skill and responsibility increases as we 
move up the hierarchy. Consequently ‘better’ workers should be assigned by the firm 
to jobs which are higher up the hierarchy. Therefore the observation of the position 
filled by an employee in the firm hierarchy is arguably informative to some extent of 
both of their quality and of the quality of the match.31 It was previously hypothesised
that the expected value of the employees’ match quality should be an increasing 
function of years of pre-firm experience as individuals with more previous labour 
market experience have sampled a larger number of job-offers and have sequentially 
moved to better matches within the labour market before joining this particular firm 
(Burdett, 1978). Column 4 of table 2 therefore suggestively indicates this is true as 
average years of previous labour market for the employees within each grade of the 
hierarchy increases as the level of the hierarchy increases. To gain a better perspective 
on this issue, I present in table 3, the distribution of employees in each grade, 
conditional upon the number of years of pre-firm labour market experience the 
employees have before entry and then also conditional upon the number of years of 
experience they have within the firm.32
The table indicates that, across all four cells, employees entering the firm with 
a greater number of years of pre-firm experience tend to be increasing relatively more 
                                                
31 Brunello and Ariga (1997) argue the same point.
32 Presenting the distribution of grade class jointly conditional on given values of both the covariates 
would generate problems with presentation. The alert reader may point out, however, that in general a 
worker with a worker with long tenure will tend be expected to have shorter years of pre-firm 
experience, compared to a given worker with an average spell of tenure. 
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concentrated in senior management grades. For example, for the male employees with 
a higher level of education who enter the firm with less than one year of pre-firm 
experience, less than 29 percent of them are seen to operate within senior 
management grades in the firm. However for those enter the firm with between 15 to 
20 years of pre-firm experience nearly 50 percent occupy senior management. As 
such, it does appear that expected match quality of an employee is greater – if grade 
in the hierarchy is a valid indicator of match quality- the greater the years of previous 
labour market experience that employee has.  
The trend between years of service and the grade in the hierarchy is far more 
pronounced. The highest proportion of the employees with less than one year of 
service is seen to operate in the training grades. However this proportion alters 
smoothly in favour of higher grades as we consider the groups of employees with 
increasingly higher observed years of service. This is initially suggestive that 
expected individual or match quality (two time-invariant characteristics) is increasing
with years of service for it was hypothesised that ‘better’ workers should be assigned 
to higher levels in the hierarchy. However this suggestion ignores the dynamic nature 
of the firms’ learning about individuals’ quality or their match quality, as suggested in 
Jovanovic’s (1979) ‘experience’ good model of matching and mobility. To explain, 
equations (3) and (4) indicated that each individuals actual firm match and individual 
quality were time invariant. Even so, it will take time for the employee and firm to 
learn about the value of these parameters and uncertainty about the true quality 
declines with tenure. Therefore perceived match quality (which determines wages and 
mobility) is in fact time-variant. As such the stylised model presented is more 
applicable to perfect information setting and the search good model of job mobility 
(Burdett, 1978) in which match quality is known ex ante. In Jovanovic’s model there 
is a sequential updating of the expected value of their match quality and individual 
quality which then – if position held in the firm is indicative of the firm’s expectation 
of these qualities –this may lead to an evolutionary position change for the employees 
in the firm hierarchy. These positional changes are optimal responses from further 
learning about the workers’ quality and arguably ‘better’ workers should climb the job 
ladder faster.33 As such this is not definitive evidence that expected match quality or 
individual quality is increasing in years of service. To explain, consider a cohort of 
employees who enter the firm and are scattered across various grades in the hierarchy. 
After the tenth year we may observe that the positions occupied by the remaining 
employees tend to, on average, be higher. This does not necessarily indicate, by itself, 
that the average value of (the time-invariant) match quality or individual quality of 
employees at the firm has increased after ten years of service for we do not observe 
what would occur if those employees who left the firm actually remained. It may be 
that the positions occupied by the entire cohort after ten years would have been, on 
average, even higher.
                                                
33 Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) in their analysis of the wage policy of the management 
employees in a single medium sized US based service firm found that workers who receive larger wage 
increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted more quickly.  
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Table 3
Distribution of Employees in Grade Class Conditional on Years of Experience
   a. Males/Secondary Education                                                                                                     b. Males/Higher Education
pexpernet, x Training 
Grades
(T1 – T3)
Clerical 
Grades
(C1 – C2)
Middle 
Management
Grades
( M1 – M2)
Senior
Management
Grades
(SM1 –SM5)
pexpernet, x Training 
Grades
(T1 – T3)
Clerical
Grades
(C1 – C2)
Middle 
Management
Grades
Senior
Management
Grades
(SM1 –SM5)
x<1 1,110 11.08 36.4 39.91 8.38 x<1 1,245 4.66 15.83 44.9 28.75
1≥x<2 681 17.47 44.34 27.76 5.43 1≥x<2 573 8.9 21.64 34.73 21.46
2≥x<5 1,197 31 35.42 20.97 3.84 2≥x<5 1,163 8.43 23.91 35.25 16.42
5≥x<10 1,090 22.76 38.62 20.74 6.24 5≥x<10 1,093 3.57 11.89 35.23 34.67
10≥x<15 667 15.59 28.78 28.78 13.05 10≥x<15 553 2.35 8.13 31.1 46.47
15≥x<20 369 11.65 25.2 30.9 19.24 15≥x<20 268 0.75 4.48 33.96 48.51
20≥x<25 214 10.75 21.97 38.79 16.82 20≥x<25 130 2.31 6.16 38.46 43.08
x≥25 256 16.41 27.35 27.34 18.36 x≥25 90 4.44 12.23 33.34 38.89
service, y service, y
y<1 878 56.38 21.87 11.73 2.05 y<1 693 19.33 26.7 27.13 9.96
1≥y<2 548 38.68 32.48 15.14 4.74 1≥y<2 579 10.37 23.49 35.76 13.64
2≥y<5 886 25.51 44.24 13.77 5.75 2≥y<5 1,045 5.07 21.72 34.93 22.48
5≥y<10 894 6.48 45.42 29.42 8.72 5≥y<10 811 1.73 14.92 41.43 31.2
10≥y<15 1,718 4.3 39.53 42.55 8.55 10≥y<15 863 0.46 8.46 43.8 38.48
15≥y<20 200 1.5 15 40.5 18.5 15≥y<20 330 0.30 5.45 38.49 46.97
20≥y<25 253 0.40 17 39.92 26.48 20≥y<25 433 0.46 5.78 35.1 54.42
y≥25 207 1.94 15.94 40.58 29.96 y≥25 361 0.28 5.54 39.61 49.32
c. Females/Secondary Education                                                                                                     d. Females/Higher Education
pexpernet, x Training 
Grades
(T1 – T3)
Clerical
Grades
(C1 – C2)
Middle 
Management
Grades
(C1 – C2)
Senior
Management
Grades
(SM1 –SM5)
pexpernet, x Training 
Grades
(T1 – T3)
Clerical
Grades
(C1 – C2)
Middle 
Management
Grades
( M1 – M2)
Senior
Management
Grades
(SM1 –SM5)
x<1 1,446 15.63 61.75 18.12 0.97 x<1 709 9.87 34.13 42.03 7.05
1≥x<2 1,088 25.27 57.72 12.14 0.83 1≥x<2 388 20.62 35.06 26.03 6.18
2≥x<5 1,890 39.42 45.66 8.73 0.32 2≥x<5 711 20.11 31.79 25.18 6.75
5≥x<10 1,681 34.5 43.07 9.52 0.78 5≥x<10 504 10.91 24.6 31.74 16.07
10≥x<15 880 23.07 49.54 12.5 1.02 10≥x<15 206 5.83 24.76 35.92 17.48
15≥x<20 564 22.34 52.3 12.76 1.95 15≥x<20 95 9.47 22.11 24.21 24.21
20≥x<25 409 28.11 46.21 9.05 1.46 20≥x<25 44 13.63 20.45 40.9 13.64
x≥25 360 31.12 48.06 8.05 0.28 x≥25 28 7.14 32.14 21.43 14.28
service, y service, y
y<1 1,396 69.63 17.76 2.65 0.14 y<1 450 37.11 25.33 13.55 4
1≥y<2 911 55.55 30.63 4.06 0.22 1≥y<2 384 26.04 31.51 22.66 4.95
2≥y<5 1,463 33.36 49.08 3.89 0.34 2≥y<5 660 13.33 36.97 25.91 8.49
5≥y<10 1,324 10.81 64.05 14.95 0.83 5≥y<10 417 2.88 27.1 41.25 13.91
10≥y<15 2,650 9.28 67.32 18.9 0.86 10≥y<15 464 1.72 32.55 43.96 14.22
15≥y<20 213 6.57 55.87 23 5.17 15≥y<20 96  1.04 19.8 60.42 13.55
20≥y<25 239 4.6 55.65 25.94 2.93 20≥y<25 153 0.65 24.84 47.71 21.57
y≥25 122 4.92 59.02 21.32 6.56 y≥25 61 29.51 54.1 14.76
Note: Workers who are in unclassified grades in the hierarchy are not represented in the table. pexpernet refers to the proxied 
number of years of pre-firm labour market experience, while service refers to years of within-firm labour market experience (or 
tenure)
4. Empirical results
4.1. Nonparametric Estimates
The specification of the semi-parametric partially linear model is
lnhrwagei = β0 + f(servicei, pexperneti) + β1msi + β2childi+ β3regioni + εi, (16)
where the mean of εi, conditional on the explanatory variables, is zero. The definition 
of the variables in the model was presented in the previous section, and estimation 
was discussed in section two.
I present in table 4, the parametric estimates jβ

of equation 16. Given the 
interest of this paper is with regard to the within firm experience- earnings profiles, I 
focus discussion upon the estimation results of these. However as the parametric 
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estimates add further explanatory power to understanding the earnings differentials of 
the firm’s workers, some discussion is merited. Firstly I note that all the estimates of 
the parametric components of the model are in line with prior expectations. A male 
employee with a secondary level of education who is based in London can expect to 
earn over 35 percent more than a similarly characterised individual employed 
elsewhere in Britain, all else equal. For female and male employees with a higher 
level of education, they can expect around 50 percent higher wages than those 
employees with a higher education upon labour market entry who are based 
elsewhere. The personnel records indicate that firm employs in 13 regions across 
Britain, with over 34 percent of the total sample employed in Greater London. Such 
estimates indicate that the London based employees are either of significantly higher 
quality and /or operate in jobs involving far greater complexity than elsewhere. Those 
who are married tend to enjoy an earnings premium relative to those not. Either 
marital status is acting as a proxy for personal traits relating to success in the work 
environment, or the relative stability associated with married individuals is being 
rewarded with a premium. The effect of having children upon earnings tends to 
operate in different directions across genders. A man with children can expect to earn 
around 9 percent more than a man without, while a woman with children can expect 
to earn nearly 5 percent less than a woman without, all else equal. Women with 
children have presumably taken time out of the labour market prior to entering the 
firm, which has correspondingly interrupted their human capital investment process, 
hence they earn less. 
Table 4
Parameter Estimates of Semi-Parametric Modela
Parameter a.Males/Secondary Education b.Males/Higher Education c.Females/Secondary Education d.Females/Higher Education
ms .102
(.0135)
.126
(.0175)
.007*
(.006)
.0352
(.0173)
child .0925
(.0142)
.0873
(.018)
-.0466
(.007)
-.050
(.023)
region .353
(.010)
.500
(.0120)
.284
(.006)
.510
(.015)
number of 
observations
5584 5115 8318 2685
a 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable is lnhrwage. Nonparametric estimates of models displayed in figures 2 and 
3. * indicates not significant at any reasonable level of confidence. 
As two variables - years of within-firm experience and years of pre-firm 
experience - are being modelled nonparametrically the resulting estimates f (.)

can be 
graphed as a surface over pexpernet and service coordinates. However it is hard to see 
details of the structure of f (.)

 in such a plot. Therefore to aid interpretability I choose 
instead to display cross sections of the surface. 
Figure 2 displays the estimated within-firm experience-earnings profiles with 
various years of pre-firm experience held constant.34 In line with prior expectations, 
the expected starting wage at the firm is shown to be increasing in years of pre-firm 
experience. From a human capital perspective, an individual with greater years of 
previous labour market experience will have accumulated more general human capital 
upon entry to the firm and is therefore rewarded with a higher starting salary than a 
worker with less years of previous labour market experience prior to entry.35 In 
                                                
34 The chosen years of pre-firm experience are 1, 5, 10, 15, and 25. Displaying more within-firm 
experience-earnings profiles would yield presentational difficulties. A full set of estimation results are 
available on request.  
35 This trend does slow down and reverse as years of previous experience increases further.
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addition, the estimated profiles for those with a higher education are higher than that 
for those with a secondary education. This again is in line with prior expectations. The 
other immediately obvious trend is that the within-firm earnings profiles are not 
parallel across different years of previous years of labour market experience, therefore
indicating that the function f(.)  is not additive in functions of pexpernet and service. 
Specifically, the estimated wage growth for a given number of years of service 
becomes lower the higher are the number of years of experience accumulated out-with 
the firm before entry. By the same token, regardless of the number of years of outside 
experience, earnings growth diminishes with years of tenure, hence the within-firm 
earnings profiles display concavity. This finding can of course be reconciled with 
basic predictions of rational human capital investment: the incentive to invest in 
human capital declines as the worker ages, as investment undertaken at older ages can 
only be rented out for shorter periods due to an investment horizon which naturally 
declines with age (Ben-Porath, 1967) and wages follow the productivity path created 
by such human capital investment. 
In table 5, I present estimates of cumulative within-firm wage growth 
rewarded for the completion of various years of tenure. The table is divided into four 
panels, representing each of the cells over which estimation took place. Within each 
panel, each row refers to a given number of years of previous experience held 
constant and the remaining columns display expected cumulative wage growth from 
entry to after various years of tenure. Consider first the estimated within-firm earnings 
growth for male employees who have attained only up to a secondary level of 
education prior to entry into the labour market. The worker falling into this category 
who enters the firm after one year of previous labour market experience can expect 
cumulative wage growth of over 55 percent after five years of service and over 77 
percent after ten years of service. While a worker entering after fifteen years of 
previous labour market experience can however expect cumulative wage growth of 
only 49 and 54 percent after the same number of years of service. 
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Figure 2: Nonparametrically Estimated Within-Firm Experience Earnings Profiles
Table 3
Estimates of Within-Firm Wage Growth*
                                      
service 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 25
pexpernet
a.Males/Secondary 
Education:
1 0.146 0.278 0.375 0.463 0.554 0.773 1.158 1.600 1.724
5 0.104 0.213 0.308 0.400 0.495 0.907 1.147 1.371 1.409
10 0.156 0.286 0.406 0.548 0.646 0.901 0.937 1.149 1.133
15 0.123 0.253 0.381 0.451 0.492 0.537 0.626 0.686 -
20 0.070 0.131 0.178 0.204 0.219 0.404 0.526 - -
25 0.047 0.089 0.128 0.163 0.195 0.375 - - -
b.Males/Higher Education:
1 0.097 0.270 0.381 0.433 0.582 1.171 1.130 1.199 1.437
5 0.017 0.145 0.296 0.447 0.486 1.082 1.543 1.304 1.246
10 0.155 0.230 0.249 0.318 0.415 0.648 0.830 0.837 0.675
15 0.130 0.248 0.294 0.266 0.445 0.610 0.467 - -
20 0.036 0.100 0.172 0.187 0.121 0.121 0.121 - -
25 -0.054 -0.098 -0.130 -0.149 -0.152 -0.126 - - -
c.Females/Secondary 
Education:
1 0.157 0.284 0.361 0.411 0.528 0.656 0.955 1.195 1.232
5 0.110 0.228 0.307 0.365 0.441 0.644 0.858 0.976 0.949
10 0.132 0.241 0.287 0.367 0.467 0.634 0.595 0.671 0.720
15 0.091 0.156 0.208 0.273 0.346 0.497 0.451 0.445 -
20 0.059 0.120 0.188 0.251 0.316 0.408 0.398 - -
25 0.050 0.102 0.154 0.202 0.248 0.320 - - -
d.Females/Higher 
Education:
1 0.154 0.308 0.366 0.459 0.627 0.817 1.180 1.272 1.197
5 0.153 0.251 0.276 0.383 0.589 0.968 1.147 0.935 0.667
10 0.125 0.252 0.331 0.397 0.488 0.441 0.480 0.445 0.200
15 0.090 0.184 0.266 0.338 0.402 0.378 0.348 0.336 -
20 0.097 0.185 0.260 0.319 0.361 0.335 0.285 - -
25 0.032 0.052 0.063 0.067 0.064 0.023 - - -
*
 Results refer to the estimated cumulative wage growth from zero to various years of service 
dependent upon a given number of years of pre-firm experience accumulated before entry to the firm. 
To gain a different perspective into the estimated lifecycle earnings dynamics 
of the workers in the firm, in figure 3 I display the nonparametrically estimated log 
wage against total years of labour market experience. Consequently these within-firm 
earnings profiles begin at p years of labour market experience, with p being equal to 
the number of years of pre-firm labour market experience. Therefore, joining the 
starting points of each of the curves in the figures is in fact the estimated ‘starting 
earnings profile’: expected log wages for a given number of years of pre-firm 
experience with years of service held constant at zero.
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Figure 3: Nonparametrically Estimated Experience Earnings Profiles
Consistent with the notion that experience accumulated prior to entry into the 
firm will have involved both general and specific training, but that only general 
training (by definition) is reflected in entry wages at the firm, expected wages are less 
on entry -regardless of years of pre-firm experience –when compared to the wages of 
those with equal years of total labour market experience, but less years of pre-firm 
experience (so more years of service). However, the initial gap in estimated wages of 
an entrant to the firm, relative to the incumbents appears to diminish with years of 
service, as shown by the converge of the various within firm experience earnings 
profiles. A potential human capital explanation is simply that the accumulation of 
firm-specific human capital happens only fairly rapidly upon entry, so that once 
accumulated, expected earnings within the firm at a given number of years of total 
labour market experience tend to converge, regardless of the number of years of 
previous labour market experience accumulated before entry.36  
There are also clear differences between the profiles for those coming into the 
labour market with a higher education and those with a secondary education. Firstly, 
the estimated entry wages after a given number of years of previous experience 
compared to the estimated wages of the already incumbent employees is much less 
                                                
36 This is in fact perhaps consistent with Altonji and Shakotko’s (1987) findings. They included a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if  tenureijt >0 in their earnings function to capture early career growth with 
tenure that is otherwise restricted by their parametric specification. In both their least squares and IV 
corrected estimates they find that much of the wage increase with tenure occurs in the first year of the 
job, even more so for the corrected (true) estimates in which the wage-tenure profile is essentially flat 
after zero years on the job (table 1, pp.444). Also, Bartel (1995, pp.408, table 4) using data of 
professional employees from the personnel records of a large manufacturing company with direct 
information on formal training confirmed that both the probability of receiving training and the amount 
of training are highest for the newly hired employees.
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drastic than that displayed for those with a secondary school level of education. A 
potential explanation is that individuals with a higher level of education tend to be 
joining from firms within the same industry to a greater extent than those employees 
with a secondary level of education. Given that industry specific human capital is not 
lost when moving across firms within the same industry, then the gap in starting 
wages will be less for entrants compared to incumbents for those with a higher level 
of education than those with a secondary level of education.37 However information 
on where previous experience was accumulated is unobserved in the personnel dataset 
and this precludes investigation of the hypothesis.
What seems at seems at odds with human capital theory - on face value at least 
- is that the earnings profiles for individuals with a higher level of education holding 
various years of previous experience constant tend to overtake each other as years of 
service accumulates. In the absence of specific human capital we would expect that 
E(lnhrwage | service = 15) = E(lnhrwage| service =10, pexpernet=5), but not that 
E(lnhrwage | service = 15) < E(lnhrwage| service =10, pexpernet=5). However, this is 
only true if with reference to a given worker. The presented estimates are conditional 
on observable variables and unobserved heterogeneity across workers is not explicitly 
controlled for. In equation 3, it was hypothesised that the expected match quality of 
workers entering the firm is increasing in years of previous labour market experience 
and support for this hypothesis was given in table 3, where it was found that a given 
worker is far more likely to be situated in the top senior management level of the 
hierarchy if he enters the firm with more years of previous labour market experience. 
As such, a rational hypothesis is that the wage level is increasing in previous labour 
market experience and that it is increasing enough, so that the within-firm earnings 
profiles overtake as service increases. However it must be noted that another 
influence which is not controlled for is the influence of mobility behaviour of the 
employees after entry into the firm and again this will influence the estimated within-
firm earnings profiles. Whether match-quality and individual quality is an increasing 
or decreasing function of years of tenure is unknown. Moreover, although the concave 
structure of the profiles are consistent with the predications of human capital theory, 
the influence of agency themed models with lifecycle implications, such as Lazear’s 
(1979, 1981) delayed payment model, which assert that earnings will increase with 
service regardless of productivity enhancing human capital accumulation, cannot be 
ruled out.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to 1) respond to the specification uncertainty with 
regard to parametric earnings functions by specifying the earnings function as a 
                                                
37 Parent (2000) and Neal (1995) present evidence suggesting the importance of industry-specific 
human capital as opposed to purely firm- specific human capital for the interpretation of the earnings-
tenure profile. Using data from both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Parent (2000) finds that when controlling for total experience in 
the current industry that the effect of tenure on wages is markedly reduced, almost fully so when using 
the methodological approach of Altonji and Shakotko (1987). Likewise, Neal (1995) finds, using data 
from the Displaced Worker Surveys, that tenure with the pre-displacement employer is positively 
correlated with the wage earned in the post-displacement job only for workers who stay in the same 
industry. Also, Neal (1999) argues, in a stylized model of job search, that more educated workers are 
less likely to make a career change (which he defines as a switch of industry of employment) after 
committing to full-time employment and finds support for this hypothesis using the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
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partially-linear semiparametric model and by estimating the earnings function across 
schooling groups as well as genders and to 2) investigate the interpretability issues 
surrounding experience-earnings profiles.
The nonparametrically estimated within-firm experience profiles confirmed 
the influence of heterogeneity across employees and the influence which this has upon 
the expected wages of individuals within the firm. The estimated within-firm earnings 
profiles were conditional upon the number of years of previous labour market 
experience accumulated before entry and it was shown that the profiles tend to 
converge. The rapidity of convergence was much faster for employees who entered 
the labour market with a higher level of education and in fact, for these employees, 
the profiles actually overtook each other. As such, the separation of schooling groups 
in estimation of the earnings profiles was merited. The fact that an individual entering 
the firm with more years of previous labour market experience is estimated to earn 
more than an incumbent employee with the same years of total experience, but more 
years of tenure, is un-reconcilable with the notion of homogenous employees, but can 
be explained with heterogeneity in expected match quality and individual quality, 
both of which are a function of years of service and previous experience. The 
hypothesis that expected firm-match quality is an increasing function of previous 
labour market experience was given support in the data analysis section, where is was 
shown the likelihood of an employee occupying a senior management grade in the 
hierarchy was increasing in years of previous experience.  
The primary merit and value added in this paper was in the econometric 
methodology utilised. The approach is somewhat novel in this area of economics and 
the estimation results have formed a valuable tool in the exploration and 
understanding of earnings evolution within the firm. 
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